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PERFECT COMMUNICATION EQUILIBRIA IN REPEATED
GAMES WITH IMPERFECT MONITORING
TRISTAN TOMALA
Abstract. The aim of this paper is to study a notion of perfectness for com-
munication equilibira in repeated games, to characterize the corresponding set
of equilibrium payoﬀs and ﬁnally to derive a Folk theorem.
1. Introduction
The central result in the theory of repeated games is the Folk Theorem which
states that when players are patient enough, every feasible and individually rational
payoﬀ vector can be sustained by an equilibrium. The equilibrium construction is
well known: players agree on a contract that speciﬁes the actions to play and in case
of deviation from the contract, the deviating player is punished to his individually
rational level. This reasoning relies on the assumption that actions are publicly
observable. Since many economic situations are modelled by games with imperfect
observation, a challenging problem is to characterize the set of equilibrium payoﬀs
when players get imperfect and private signals.
Much is known about games with public signals and perfect public equilibria
who have a natural recursive structure studied in Abreu, Pearce and Stachetti
[APS90]. An adaptation of the Bellmann equation from dynamic programming to
those games permits to characterize the set of payoﬀs associated to perfect public
equilibria of the δ-discounted game as the largest ﬁxed point of some correspon-
dance. The asymptotic behavior of this set as the discount factor δ goes to 1 is
also well known and due to Fundenberg, Levine and Maskin [FLM94] and Fuden-
berg and Levine [FL94]. It has been recognized (see the special JET issue) that
generally, restricting to public strategies might bound equilibrium payoﬀs away
from eﬃciency, even in games with public signals. However, without public strate-
gies, sequential equilbria lose their recursive properties. A way to circumvent this
diﬃculty is to allow for some kind of communication between players to restore
eﬃciency of equilibria: Ben-Porath and Kahneman [BPK96], Compte [Com98] and
Kandori and Matsushima [KM98], consider models where players communicate by
making public announcments.
The aim of the present paper is to study communication equilibria (Myerson
[Mye82], Forges [For86]) of repeated games with general signals since this notion
covers all kinds of possible communication technologies and thus provides an upper
bound on the set of equilibrium payoﬀs; and further to study them by recursive
methods ` a la [APS90], [FLM94] and [FL94]. It thus combines two approaches: the
systematic study of communication equilibria of repeated games with imperfect
monitoring, conducted in Renault and Tomala [RT04] for undiscounted games, and
the use of Fundenberg and Levine’s [FL94] characterization in games with public
communication made by Kandori and Matsushima [KM98].
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We introduce an agent called mediator who is external to the game and has the
ability to communicate with players between stages. The mediator has no interest
in the outcome of the game an does not observe neither the actions played nor the
signals observed by the players. After each stage, the mediator receives messages
(inputs) from the players and sends them back some outputs. No restriction in
placed on the set of inputs/outputs or on the way the mediator selects outputs,
thus any speciﬁcation of a communication technology can be seen as a particular
instance of the mediator. A communication equilibrium is then a speciﬁcation of the
technology used by the mediator (a communication device) and a Nash equilibrium
of the game deﬁned by the repeated game with communication through the device.
A direct application of the revelation principle says that any communication equi-
librium outcome can be obtained by a canonical communication equilibrium where:
(1) the device recommends privately each player which action to play at each stage,
each player reports a signal to the mediator and (2) each player has an incentive
to always play the recommended action and to report the observed signal, i.e. to
play faithfully. A canonical communication equilibrium is thus a relatively simple
object: it is simply a strategy of the mediator who chooses proﬁles of recommended
actions and observes proﬁles of reported signals, such that the proﬁle of faithful
strategies is a Nash equilibrium of the game induced by the communication device.
We introduce the concept of perfect communication equilibrium which simply a
canonical communication device such that after every history of the mediator, the
communication device that starts with this history is a canonical communication
equilibrium. For such a device, playing faithfully is a sequential equilibrium of the
extended game. This concept is stronger than sequential communication equilib-
rium of Myerson [Mye86]. Indeed, playing faithfully is a belief-freeequilibrium of
the extended game as introduced in Ely et al.[Ely03].
The set of payoﬀs associated to perfect communication equilibria C(δ) behaves
like a set of perfect public equilibrium payoﬀs, i.e. it has at recursive structure ` a
la [APS90], the asymptotic properties are similar and most of the analysis made
by [FLM94] and [FL94] carries out. We thus give a characterization of the limit
of C(δ) as δ goes to one, we study the limit set and, as Kandori and Matsushima
[KM98] did for public communication, we derive suﬃcient conditions for a Folk
theorem to hold.
The model of repeated games and communication equilibria are described in
section 2. In section 3, we introduce our perfect communication equilibria and
discuss links with sequential equilibria and perfect public equilibria. The recursive
structure is studied in section 4. The characterization of the limit set of perfect
communication equilibrium payoﬀs is given in section 5. We give properties of the
limit set in section 6. Our version of the Folk Theorem is in section 7.
2. Model and definitions
2.1. The game. We present a general model of repeated games with complete
information and imperfect monitoring. The data of the game are: a ﬁnite set of
players {1,...,n}; for each player i a ﬁnite set of actions Ai, a ﬁnite set of signals




j Y j → R; a signaling technology given by





The game is played in discrete time. At each stage t = 1,2,..., each player
i = 1,...,n chooses an action ai from his own set of action and if a = (a1,...,an)
is the action proﬁle played, a proﬁle of signals y = (y1,...,yn) is selected with
probability q(y|a). Each player i observes then yi and the game goes to stage t+1.
Player i realized payoﬀ at this stage is ri(a,y) and is not directly observed. WePERFECT COMMUNICATION 3
denote A =
Q
j Aj the set of action proﬁles and Y =
Q
j Y j the set of signal proﬁles.
Players discount payoﬀ at a common rate 0 ≤ δ < 1 and if (at,yt)t≥1 is the sequence
of realized action and signal proﬁles, the discounted payoﬀ of player i is
X
t≥1(1 − δ)δt−1ri(at,yt).
This model encompasses several well known models and in particular, games
with deterministic and/or public signals. The signals are said to be deterministic
when for each action proﬁle a, there is a unique signal proﬁle such that q(y|a) = 1.
In such case, the signaling structure can be represented by mappings (fi)i=1,...,n
with fi : A → Y i. A particular case considered in some papers (Ben-Porath and
Kahnemann [BPK96], Renault and Tomala [RT98]) is when players are arranged
in a network, i.e. are vertices of a graph and monitor the action of their neighbors.
Another particular case thoroughly studied in the literature is games with public
signals. Signals have a public part when each players signal set can be written as
Y i = Zi × Zp and when the signalling technology selects for each player a private
signal zi in Zi and a public signal zp in Zp. Each player i then observes his pri-
vate signal and all players observe the public signal. In our model, this is simply
a restriction imposed on the transition probability q which must select the same
element of zp for each player.
Note that in the previous description, the stage-game is not completely deﬁned.






The normal form game G = (A1,...,An;g1,...,gn) will be thus refered to as the
stage-game or one-shot game. Also in the sequel we shall deal with correlated dis-
tribution on actions. Given a probability distribution p on A, the expected payoﬀ




and the payoﬀ vector yielded by p is g(p) = (g1(p),...,gn(p)). The set of feasible
payoﬀs (the feasible set) is the set of such vectors as p varies:
V = {g(p) | p ∈ ∆(A)}
This is also the convex hull of payoﬀ vectors associated to action proﬁles, i.e. setting
g(a) = (g1(a),...,gn(a)), V is the convex hull of the set {g(a) | a ∈ A}.
Throughout the paper, we will use the following notations. If (Ei)i=1,...,n is a
collection of sets indexed on players, E will denote
Q
i∈N Ei, an element (ei)i∈N in
E will be denoted by e, and e−i will stand for the current element of E−i =
Q
j6=iEj.
We write e = (ei,e−i) when the i-th component is stressed. If E is a ﬁnite set, |E|
will denote its cardinality and ∆(E) the set of probability distributions over E. An
element e in E will be identiﬁed with the Dirac mass on e. For p = (p(e))e∈E in
∆(E), suppp will denote the support of p. We also let int∆(E) be the interior of
∆(E), i.e. the set of p’s with full support.
2.2. Communication equilibria. We describe now the notion of communication
equilibria due to Myerson [Mye82], [Mye86] and Forges [For86].
We add to the game an external player called the mediator who has no interest
in the outcome of the game, who cannot observe actions or signals but who can
communicate with players between stages. At the end of each stage, each player
can send privately a message (called an input in Forges) to the mediator. The me-
diator reads all his messages and produces for each player a recommendation (called4 TRISTAN TOMALA
output in Forges) which he sends privately to this player. The mediator knows only
past messages and recommendations and does not observe the play of the game.
No restriction is posed on the sets of messages and recommendations, in particular
they might be inﬁnite, stage or history dependent. No restriction is made either
on the way the mediator forms recommendations from messages. This allows the
model to cover all possible methods of communication, for instance models where
each player makes a public announcment (see e.g. [BPK96], [Com98], [KM98]) are
particular cases since all are speciﬁcations of unmediated talk between players. A
communication device is a speciﬁcation of the communication method chosen by
the mediator.
Deﬁnition 2.1. A communication device is a tuple C = (Mi
t,Ri
t,ct)i=1,...,n;t≥1
where for each player i and stage t:
• Mi
t is the set of messages for player i at stage t and Ri
t is the set of recom-
mendations for player i at stage t. All these sets are measurable sets, the
σ-ﬁelds are left unspeciﬁed for notational simplicity.
• ct is the rule used by the mediator at stage t to select new recommendations:
– c1 is a probability distribution on
Q
iRi
1 endowed with the product σ-
ﬁeld.









to the set of probabilities on
Q
iRi
t, all product sets being endowed with
the product σ-ﬁeld.
Given a communication device C, the repeated game extended by communica-
tion by C is played as follows. At the beginning of stage 1, the mediator selects
r1 = (r1
1,...,rn
1) according to c1 and sends privately the recommendation ri
1 to
player i. Each player i then chooses an action ai
1. A proﬁle of signals y1 is drawn
according to q(·|a1) and player i privately observes yi
1. Each player i then sends
privately a message mi
1 to the mediator and this concludes the ﬁrst stage. Stage
t is described similarly except that the recommendation proﬁle rt = (r1
t,...,rn
t ) is
selected according to ct(·) which depends on past recommendations and messages.
The game is inﬁnitely repeated and payoﬀs are discounted at the common discount
factor δ.
A behavioral strategy for player i in this game is a sequence σi = (αi
t,µi
t)t≥1 where
for each t, the ﬁrst component αi
t gives the mixed action played by player i at stage
t depending on his whole past history: the recommendations he got, the actions he







t −→ ∆(Ai). The second component µi
t
gives the probability distribution on messages sent by player i at stage t, depending




s × Ai × Y i × Mi
s) × Ri
t × Ai × Y i −→
∆(Mi
t). As above, product sets are endowed with the product σ-ﬁeld and all map-
pings are measurable.
A communication device and a proﬁle of behavior strategy induce a probability
distribution on the set of inﬁnite sequences of action and signal proﬁles. Since pay-
oﬀs are uniformly bounded, the discounted expected payoﬀ is well deﬁned and the
deﬁnition of the repeated game extended by C is complete.
Deﬁnition 2.2. A communication equilibrium of the repeated game is a pair (C,σ)
where C is a communication device and σ is a Nash equilibrium of the game extended
by C.
This concept generalizes both Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria of the
repeated game: If all set of messages and recommendations are singletons, the
mediator is inactive and the correpsonding communication equilibrium is simply aPERFECT COMMUNICATION 5
Nash equilibrium. A correlated equilibrium is simply a communication equilibrium
where all sets of recommendations and messages are singletons except for the Ri
1’s.
At ﬁrst sight, the concept may look too general to be tractable. Fortunately, a
revelation principle applies which considerably simpliﬁes the analysis.
Deﬁnition 2.3. (1) A communication device is called canonical if for each
player i and stage t, Ri
t = Ai and Mi
t = Y i, i.e. the mediator suggests
player i an action to play at stage t, and player i reports a signal to the
mediator.
(2) Consider the strategy of player i that plays at each stage after each history
the action recommended by the mediator at that stage and as messages sends
at stage t the value of the signal he observed at that stage. This strategy is
called the faithful strategy.
(3) A communication equilibrium is called canonical if the communication de-
vice is canonical and the proﬁle of faithful strategies is a Nash equilibrium
of the game extended by the device.
Obviously, a canonical communication equilibrium is a communication equilib-
rium. Consider a communication equilibrium (C,σ) and assume now that the me-
diator not only operates C but also performs the computations and randomizations
deﬁned by σi and just informs player i of the results of these randomizations. This
means that player i, instead of randomizing himself, relies on the mediator to do
this job. This deﬁnes a canonical communication equilibrium that induces the same
payoﬀ for each player as (C,σ). These arguments are standard and we summarize
this discussion by the following lemma.
Lemma 2.4 (The revelation principle). For every communication equilibrium,
there is a canonical communication equilibrium that induces the same payoﬀ for
each player.
3. The solution concept
3.1. Deﬁnition. We concentrate now on canonical communication equilibria. Ob-
serve that since the sets of recommendations and messages are now ﬁxed as well
as the equilibrium strategy, a canonical communication equilibrium is only deter-
mined by a “strategy” of the mediator c = (ct)t≥1 with ct : (A×Y )t−1 → ∆(A) for
t ≥ 2 and c1 ∈ ∆(A) and we indentify the communication equilibrium with it. We
would like the equilibrium to have perfectness properties, namely c would be called
perfect if the faithful strategy proﬁle were a sequential equilibrium of the extended
repeated game. To get a recursive structure, we give a more stringent deﬁnition of
perfectness.
Consider the repeated game extended by some canonical communication device.
A history hi of length t for player i (a i-history) consists of all the actions recom-
mended to player i, all the actions played by player i, all the signals observed by him
and all signals reported by him up to stage t and we let Hi = ∪t(Ai×Ai×Y i×Y i)t
be the set of all i-histories. A pure strategy of player i will prescribe (1) which
action to play after hi and the next recommendation ai
t+1 of the mediator and (2)
which signal to report after (hi,ai




Let us call action rule a mapping αi : Ai → Ai and reporting rule a mapping
from Ai × Y i to Y i. Finally call decision rule a pair (αi, ρi) and let Di be the set
of decision rules for player i. A strategy for player i in the extended game is then
a mapping which associates to every i-history a decision rule, i.e. it is a mapping
σi : Hi → Di. The faithful decision rule ϕi is the one that plays the recommended6 TRISTAN TOMALA
action, i.e. the action rule is the indentity on Ai and reports the correct signal i.e.
the reporting rule is the projection on Y i. The faithful strategy of player i is then
the one that selects the faithful decision rule after each i-history. The canonical
communication device c is a canonical communication equilibrium iﬀ the proﬁle of
faithful strategies is a Nash equilibrium of the game extended by c.
A history of length t for the mediator (a m-history) consists of all action proﬁles
recommended by the mediator and all signal proﬁles reported by the players up to
stage t, thus an element of (A × Y )t and we let Hm = ∪t(A × Y )t be the set of
all m-histories. For every m-history h of the mediator, we let c(·|h) be the canon-
ical communication device induced by c after history h, i.e. if h0 is a m-history,
c(h0|h) = c(hh0) where hh0 is the concatenated history.
Deﬁnition 3.1. The canonical communication device c is a perfect communica-
tion equilibrium if for every history h ∈ Hm of the mediator, c(·|h) is a canonical
communication equilibrium.
Notice that, although perfectly well deﬁned, the concept has more punch when
interpreted from the point of view of the mediator. Indeed, since player i is not
aware of the history of the mediator, a strategy for player i after h is not deﬁned and
player i is not able to compute his continuation payoﬀ. However, if all player know
that the communication device is perfect, they all are conﬁdent that at any point
in the game, playing the faithful strategy would be a best-reply if they had more
information, i.e. if they did observe the history of the mediator. Consequently, if
c is a perfect communication equilibrium, then the faithful strategy is a sequential
equilibrium of the extended game: whatever player i’s beliefs are, his best response
is to play the faithful strategy. This is deeply related to belief-freeequilibria in-
troduced in [Ely03]. Indeed, for a perfect communication equilibrium, the faithful
strategy proﬁle is a belief-free equilibrium of the extended game.
Perfect communication equilibria clearly exist: if c(h) is a correlated equilibrium
of the stage game for every m-history h, then c is a perfect communication equilib-
rium. We let C(δ) be the set of payoﬀ vectors associated to perfect communication
equilibria of the game with discount factor δ. All such payoﬀs are feasible thus,
C(δ) ⊂ V .
3.2. Perfect communication equilibria and perfect public equilibria. We
give here an intuition as to why the methods of [FLM94] and [FL94] apply to our
concept. Indeed, perfect communication equilibria may be seen as particular perfect
public equilibria of an auxiliary game which we describe now.
There are n + 1 players, player i = 1,...,n is the same as in the original game
and player n + 1 is the mediator. The stage-game is in extensive form and unfolds
as follows.
• At the ﬁrst round the mediator selects an action proﬁle a and ai is privately
announced to player i.
• At the second round, players i = 1,...,n simultaneously select actions. If b
is the action proﬁle selected, a proﬁle of signals z is drawn with probability
q(z|b) and zi is privately announced to player i.
• At the third round each player reports privately a signal yi to the mediator.
• Finally, the proﬁle of recommended actions a and of reported signals y are
publicly announced.
• Player i = 1,...,n receives the payoﬀ ri(b,z) (without observing it directly)
and player n + 1 gets a payoﬀ of zero.
Players discount payoﬀs at the common rate δ and the description of the repeated
game is complete. To describe it in the usual way, let us reduce the extensive stage-PERFECT COMMUNICATION 7
game to its normal form. The action set for player n + 1 in the new stage-game
is the set of action proﬁles A in the original game while the action set for player
i = 1,...,n in the new stage-game is the set of decision rules Di. Given an action
proﬁle in the new game (a,d1,...,dn), the payoﬀ to player n + 1 is zero and the




Signals in the new game are public and if the action proﬁle (a,d1,...,dn), the signal




and is publicly announced.
Let ϕi be the strategy of player i that plays the faithful decision rule after each
stage and every history. It follows from the deﬁnitions that a communication device
c is a perfect communication equilibrium if and only if in the auxiliary game, the
strategy proﬁle (c,ϕ1,...,ϕn) is a perfect public equilibrium.
4. The recursive structure
We develop in this section an analysis of perfect communication equilibria similar
to the one made by [APS90] for public equilibria. The starting point is the well-
known one-shot deviation principle. A one-shot deviation of player i is a strategy
that always plays the faithful decision rule except after one single m-history. Note
that with this deﬁnition, a one-shot deviation of player i is not a strategy for player
i who does not know the history of the mediator. It is however a well-deﬁned strat-
egy in the auxiliary game with public signals. A canonical communication device
is immune to one-shot deviations if no player has a proﬁtable one-shot deviation.
Lemma 4.1 (The one-shot deviation principle). A canonical communication de-
vice c is a perfect communication equilibrium if and only if for every m-history h,
c(·|h) is immune to one-shot deviations.
Proof. Following the representation of perfect commnication equilibria by perfect
public equilibria from section 3.2, this is a direct consequence of the one-shot devi-
ation principle for perfect public equilibria. 
Using this result, one can write a kind of Bellmann equation for perfect com-
munication equilibria. We introduce now a family of extensive games who serve as
Bellmann operator.
Deﬁnition 4.2. Let p ∈ ∆(A) be a correlated distribution of actions, f : A×Y →
Rn, and 0 ≤ δ < 1 a discount factor. We denote by fi the i-th coordinate of f. We
deﬁne Γ(p,f,δ) as the following extensive form game.
• At the ﬁrst round, the mediator selects a ∈ A according to p and informs
privately each player i of ai.
• At the second round each player i chooses an action bi, these choices are
made simultaneously. If b is the proﬁle of action chosen, a proﬁle of signals
z is drawn according to q(·|b) and player i observes zi solely.
• At the third round, each player i reports privately a signal yi to the media-
tor, let y be the proﬁle of reported signals.
• The payoﬀ for player i is (1 − δ)ri(b,z) + δfi(a,y).
The strategy for player i that always plays at the second round the action rec-
ommended at the ﬁrst round, and always reports at the third round the signal
observed at the second round shall be refered to as the faithful strategy. Remark8 TRISTAN TOMALA
that a pure strategy for player i in this game is a decision rule di = (αi,ρi) where
αi : Ai → Ai is an action rule and ρi : Ai × Y i → Y i is a reporting rule, thus the
faithful strategy in Γ(p,f,δ) is the faithful decision rule ϕi.
We introduce the following notations. Given a probability p ∈ ∆(A) and a de-
cision rule di = (αi,ρi) for player i, we let gi(p,di) be the payoﬀ to player when
the mediator uses p to recommend actions and player i plays according to di while




We denote by Q(p,di) the probability induced by p and di on the set of proﬁles of




We also denote by Q(a,di) the probability induced by the recommended action a




Obviously, Q(p,di)(a,y) = p(a)Q(a,di)(y). When di is the faithful decision rule
ϕi, we simply denote Q(p,ϕi) by Q(p) and Q(a,ϕi) by Q(a). All these deﬁnition










Finally, in the game Γ(p,f,δ), the payoﬀ for player i when he plays di and other
players play faithfully is:
vi




For simplicity we shall denote
P
a,yQ(p,di)(a,y)fi(a,y) by Q(p,di) · fi.
Consider a perfect canonical communication equilibrium c. Let c1 ∈ ∆(A) be
the probability distribution on recommended actions at the ﬁrst stage under c and
for each proﬁle of actions a and of signals z, let fi
c(a,z) be the payoﬀ for player i
yielded by the canonical communication equilibrium c(·|a,z), i.e. this is the contin-
uation payoﬀ for player i after the ﬁrst stage given that the mediator recommended
a and was reported z. If c is a perfect communication equilibrium, one clearly has:
Claim 4.3. The faithful strategy proﬁle is a Nash equilibrium of Γ(c1,fc,δ).
Let v = (v1,...,vn) be the payoﬀ vector yielded by c, the above claim states
that the following equalities/inequalities are satisﬁed:
For every player i and decision rule di = (αi,ρi),













That is, with the notations introduced above:
vi = (1 − δ)gi(c1) + δQ(c1) · fi
c
≥ (1 − δ)gi(c1,di) + δQ(c1,di) · fi
c
The recursive analysis consists in characterizing C(δ) by using those equations
and as a ﬁxed point of a correspondence built on them.
Deﬁnition 4.4. Let p ∈ ∆(A) be a correlated distribution of actions, f : A×Y →
Rn, and 0 ≤ δ < 1 a discount factor.
• The pair (p,f) is δ-balanced if the faithful strategy if a Nash equilibrium of
Γ(p,f,δ), i.e. for each player i and decision rule di:
(1 − δ)gi(p) + δQ(p) · fi ≥ (1 − δ)gi(p,di) + δQ(p,di) · fi
• For each pair (p,f) δ-balanced, we let vi
δ(p,f) the payoﬀ for player i yielded
by the faithful strategy in Γ(p,f,δ). We denote by vδ(p,f) the corresponding
payoﬀ vector. Note that:
vδ(p,f) = (1 − δ)g(p) + δQ(p) · f
where Q(p) · f = (Q(p) · fi)i.
• Given a set of payoﬀ vectors W ⊂ Rn, we write f ∈ W to mean that
the range of f is a subset of W, i.e. f(a,y) ∈ W, ∀(a,y). We deﬁne a
correspondence Fδ which associated to W another subset of Rn:
Fδ : W 7→ {vδ(p,f) | f ∈ W,(p,f) δ − balanced}
• A payoﬀ vector v is decomposable with respect to p, W and δ if there exists
a mapping f ∈ W such that (p,f) is δ-balanced and v = vδ(p,f). A set W
is self-decomposable with respect to δ if W ⊂ Fδ(W).
The recursive characterization of the set of equilibrium payoﬀs is the following:
Theorem 4.5. C(δ) is the largest (for inclusion) bounded set which is self-
decomposable with respect to δ, i.e. C(δ) ⊂ Fδ(C(δ)) and for every bounded W,
W ⊂ Fδ(W) implies W ⊂ C(δ).
Proof. We ﬁrst show that C(δ) is self-decomposable with respect to δ. Let v ∈ C(δ)
be the payoﬀ vector associated to the perfect communcation equilibrium c. Call
c1 the distribution of recommended actions at stage 1 under c and fi
c(a,y) the
payoﬀ for player i yielded by c(·|a,y). From claim 4.3, (c1,fc) is δ-balanced and
v = vδ(c1,fc) and since c is perfect, for each pair (a,y), fc(a,y) ∈ C(δ).
Let now W be a bounded set of payoﬀs such that W ⊂ Fδ(W). For each w ∈ W,
there is a δ-balanced pair (pw,fw) with fw ∈ W such that w = vδ(pw,fw). Let us
ﬁx u ∈ W and construct inductively a perfect communication equilibrium c with
payoﬀ u. By the above property,
u = vδ(pu,fu) = (1 − δ)g(pu) + δ
X
a,yp(a)q(y|a)fu(a,y)
We set thus c1 = pu which deﬁnes the device on histories of length zero and fu
deﬁnes the continuation payoﬀ after each history of length one, i.e. for each (a,y)
the continuation payoﬀ is u2 = fu(a,y). For this vector, we have




thus we set c2(a,y) = u2. This deﬁnes c on histories of length one as well as a
continuation payoﬀ after each history of length two, i.e. after (a1,y1,a2,y2), the
continuation payoﬀ is fu2(a2,y2) with u2 = fu(a1,y1). We continue inductively in10 TRISTAN TOMALA
this way. Suppose that the device is deﬁned on all histories of length T −1 and the
continuation payoﬀs are deﬁned after all histories of length T. Consider a history
h of length T and let uT be the continuation payoﬀ after h. We have,
uT = vδ(puT,fuT) = (1 − δ)g(puT) + δ
X
a,yp(a)q(y|a)fuT(a,y)
Thus the device after h is deﬁned as puT and the continuation payoﬀ after each
history (h,a,y) of length T + 1, is fuT(a,y). 
5. The asmptotic analysis
This aim of this section is to give a characterization of limδ→1C(δ). We apply
the method developed in [FLM94] and [FL94] and adapt it to our solution concept.
Deﬁnition 5.1. Let λ be a vector in Rn and (p,f) be a δ-balanced pair. This pair
is λ-directed if:
λ · vδ(p,f) ≥ λ · f(a,y), ∀(a,y) ∈ A × Y
where u · v is the inner product in Rn.
Remark that this implies λ·g(p) ≥ λ·vδ(p,f) ≥ λ·f(a,y), ∀(a,y) ∈ A×Y , i.e.
the current payoﬀ vector is separated from continuation payoﬀs by the hyperplane
{v | λ · v = λ · vδ(p,f)}. We shall make extensive use of the following properties of
balanced pairs.
Proposition 5.2. Let (p,f) be a δ-balanced pair, α > 0 and β ∈ Rn. We let αf+β
be the mapping that assoiates to (a,y), αf(a,y) + β. Then,
(1) (p,f + β) is also δ-balanced.













(a) (p,f0) is δ0-balanced.
(b) If (p,f) is λ-directed then so is (p,f0).
(c) vδ(p,f) = vδ0(p,f0).
(4) There exists a positive constant M = M(p,f,δ) such that for each δ0 and
w ∈ Rn there is a mapping f0 for which (p,f0) is δ0-balanced and ∀(a,y),
kf0(a,y) − wk ≤ M 1−δ
0
δ0 .
(5) If (p,f0) is δ-balanced and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, then (p,αf + (1 − α)f0) is also
δ-balanced.
Proof. (1). The payoﬀ for player i in Γ(p,f + β,δ) is deduced from his payoﬀ in
Γ(p,f,δ) by adding the constant βi.
(2). The payoﬀ for player i in Γ(p,
δ(1−δ
0)
(1−δ)δ0f),δ0 is deduced from his payoﬀ in
Γ(p,f,δ) by multiplying it by the constant 1−δ
0
1−δ .
(3). (a). Follows directly from (1) and (2).





(3). (c). Straightforward computation.
(4). Let ¯ f =
P
a,yp(a)q(y|a)f(a,y), for δ0 and w ∈ Rn ﬁxed, set:
f0(a,y) = w +
δ(1 − δ0)
(1 − δ)δ0(f(a,y) − ¯ f)PERFECT COMMUNICATION 11
From (1) and (2), f0 is δ0-balanced. A simple computation shows vδ0(p,f0) = w and
setting M = δ
1−δ maxa,y

f(a,y) − ¯ f

, for each (a,y):
kf0(a,y) − wk ≤ M
1 − δ0
δ0
(5). It suﬃces to write the incentive constraints for f (ICf), for f0 (ICf0) and
to form the combination α(ICf) + (1 − α)(ICf0).

Deﬁnition 5.3. The maximal score in direction λ is:
kδ(λ) = max{λ · vδ(p,f) | (p,f) δ − balanced and λ − directed}
Lemma 5.4. The maximal score kδ(λ) does not depend on δ and is denoted k(λ).
Proof. This follows directly from point (3) of proposition 5.2. 




Theorem 5.5. (1) For each discount factor δ, C(δ) ⊂ C∗.
(2) limδ→1C(δ) = C∗.
A heuristic proof consists in recalling the analogy between perfect communcation
equilibria made in section 3.2. The set C(δ) is the set of payoﬀs associated to some
public equilibria in a game with public signals. Theorem 5.5 can thus be seen an
application of theorem 3.1 p. 111 of [FL94].
This proof is not suﬃcient since: (1) C(δ) is not the set of all public equilibria
in the auxiliary game but a subset of it, so one has to prove that their properties
are similar; (2) [FL94] assume that (the analog of) the set C∗ has non-empty inte-
rior while (i) their method of proof perfectly applies when considering the relative
interior of C∗ and (ii) since in the auxiliary game, player n+1 has payoﬀ zero, the
set of feasible payoﬀs in this game will always have empty interior. We thus give in
appendix a formal proof of theorem 5.5, verifying that most of [FL94] arguments
apply.
6. Properties of the limit set
In this section we discuss properties of the set C∗. We start by recalling usual
material on the one-shot game G = (A1,...,An;g1,...,gn). Recall that the set of
feasible payoﬀs is:
V = {g(p) | p ∈ ∆(A)}
A correlated equilibrium of the game G is a distribution p ∈ ∆(A) such that for





Let C(G) be the set of correlated equilibria of G and CP(G) = {g(p) | p ∈ C(G)} be
the set payoﬀs associated to correlated equilibria of G. It is well known that C(G)
is closed and convex and contains all Nash equilibria of G. Note that p ∈ C(G) if
and only if the faithful strategy proﬁle is a Nash equilibrium of the game Γ(p,f,δ)
where f ≡ 0 is constantly equal to zero.
The individual rationality level (the minmax level) of player i is the harshest
punishment that players −i can inﬂict to player i. In general it is deﬁned as
minp−imaxaigi(ai,p−i) where the min ranges over the set of mixed action proﬁles
for players −i, i.e. p−i ∈
Q
j6=i∆(Aj). It is well known that the punisment is even12 TRISTAN TOMALA
harsher when players −i are correlated, i.e. may choose p−i ∈ ∆(
Q
j6=iAj). This
correlation is possible with the help of the mediator. We thus deﬁne the (correlated)











Observe also that mi is the value of a two-player zero-sum game where: the maxi-
mizing player chooses ai, the minimizing player chooses a−i, the payoﬀ is gi(ai,a−i).
It is also the payoﬀ obtained by player i at any correlated equilibrium of this zero-
sum game (Forges, [For88]). Note that for each action ai s.t. p(ai) > 0, the
conditional distribution on A−i, p(·|ai) achieves the min in the deﬁnition of mi and
ai is a best reply to p(·|ai).
Deﬁnition 6.1. A distribution p ∈ ∆(A) is a minmax distribution for player i if
it is a correlated equilibrium of the zero-sum game (Ai,A−i,gi,−gi). Let Mi be the
(convex) set of minmax distributions for player i.
We let IR =

v ∈ Rn | ∀i, vi ≥ mi	
be the set of individually rational payoﬀs
and V ∗ = V ∩ IR. We get easily:
Lemma 6.2. (1) C∗ ⊂ V ∗
(2) CP(G) ⊂ C∗
Proof. (1). First C∗ ⊂ V . Take v ∈ C∗, for each direction λ, there exists a pair
(p,f) δ-balanced and λ-directed, s.t. λ · v ≤ λ · vδ(p,f) ≤ λ · g(p). Thus ∀λ,
λ · v ≤ maxx∈V λ · x which implies C∗ ⊂ V since V is convex.
We prove now C∗ ⊂ IR. For each player i, let ei be the unit vector whose
i-component is 1 and other components are zero. Take v ∈ C∗, for λ = −ei,
λ · v ≤ k(λ) i.e. there exists a pair (p,f) δ-balanced s.t. vi ≥ vi
δ(p,f) and
fi(a,y) ≥ vi
δ(p,f) for each (a,y). This implies that for every decision rule di,
Q(p,di) · fi ≥ vi
δ(p,f). Since the pair is balanced, for each di:
vi ≥ vi
δ(p,f)
≥ (1 − δ)gi(p,di) + δQ(p,di) · fi
≥ (1 − δ)gi(p,di) + δvi
δ(p,f)
thus vi
δ(p,f) ≥ gi(p,di). So there exists p s.t. for each di, vi ≥ gi(p,di) i.e.
vi ≥ minpmaxdigi(p,di) = mi.
(2). Let p be a correlated equilibrium of G. It is plain that for each δ and for each
constant mapping f, the pair (p,f) is δ-balanced. In particular, letting for each
(a,y), f(a,y) = g(p), we get vδ(p,f) = g(p) and for each λ, λ·vδ(p,f) = λ·f(a,y).
Thus g(p) ∈ C∗. 
An easy case to study is when signals are trivial that is, they reveal nothing
about the action proﬁle played. This can be modelled by letting the signal sets be
singletons or by assuming that q(y|a) does not depend on a. In such a case, there
is no link between stages so one expects that at each stage, the players play a static
(correlated) equilibrium. This intuitive reasoning is formalized in the next lemma:
Lemma 6.3. If signals are trivial, C∗ = CP(G).PERFECT COMMUNICATION 13
Proof. We assume that signal sets are singletons for simplicity. Thanks to the pre-
vious lemma, we only need to prove C∗ ⊂ CP(G). For each v ∈ C∗ and each
direction λ, there exists (p,f) δ-balanced, λ-directed s.t. λ · v ≤ λ · vδ ≤ λ · g(p).
Since signals are trivial, f(a,y) does not depend on actions played and on signals.
The payoﬀ for player i when he plays di is:
(1 − δ)gi(p,di) + δQ(p) · fi
therefore playing faithfully is a best reply for player i in Γ(p,f,δ) if and only if it
maximizes gi(p,di). Thus, p ∈ C(G). Then, for each v ∈ C∗ and each direction λ,
there exists p ∈ C(G) s.t. λ · v ≤ λ · g(p) which implies C∗ ⊂ CP(G). 
6.1. Enforceability. We examine when a distribution p may be part of a balanced
pair (p,f). Namely, given p, does there exists a mapping f such that playing faith-
fully is a Nash equilibrium of Γ(p,f,δ). Assume that player i has a decision rule
di that increases his stage-payoﬀ: gi(p,di) > gi(p) and does not aﬀect the reported
signals: Q(p,di) = Q(p), i.e. ∀a ∈ suppp, Q(a,di) = Q(a). In such case, no f can
make (p,f) a balanced pair. Indeed, if no player can increase his payoﬀ without
aﬀecting signals, then there exists f such that (p,f) is balanced.
Deﬁnition 6.4. (1) A distribution p ∈ ∆(A) is enforceable if there is δ and a
mapping f s.t. (p,f) is δ-balanced.
(2) A distribution p ∈ ∆(A) is immune to undetectable deviations if for each
player i and (mixed) decision rule µi ∈ ∆(Di):
Q(p,µi) = Q(p) =⇒ gi(p,µi) ≤ gi(p)
Proposition 6.5. The correlated ditribution p is enforceable if and only if p is
immune to undetectable deviations.
Proof. As mentioned above, if p is not immune to undetectable deviations, there is
a player i, a mixed decision rule µi s.t. Q(p,µi) = Q(p) and gi(p,µi) > gi(p). Then
µi is a proﬁtable deviation in Γ(p,f,δ) for any δ and f.
Assume now that p is immune to undetectable deviations. Let δ be a discount
factor and f : A × Y → Rn. The pair (p,f) is δ-balanced if for each player i and
decision rule di:
(1 − δ)gi(p) + δQ(p) · fi ≥ (1 − δ)gi(p,di) + δQ(p,di) · fi
That is, for each player i we must solve the system:
(1)

(Q(p) − Q(p,di)) · fi ≥
1 − δ
δ
(gi(p,di) − gi(p)) (∀di)
We apply the alternative theorem (see e.g. Ky Fan [Fan56] or Rockafellar [Roc70]):
A linear system of inequalities Mx ≥ c has a solution iﬀ (β ≥ 0 and βM = 0
imply β · c ≤ 0) where ≥ means component-wise weak inequality. Letting M be
the matrix with row vectors (Q(p) − Q(p,di)), di ∈ Di and c be the column vector
with di-component 1−δ
δ (gi(p,di) − gi(p)), the system (1) has a solution fi iﬀ p is
immune to undetectable deviations from player i. 
Let P be the set of enforceable distributions and g(P) the corresponding set of
payoﬀs.
Lemma 6.6. C∗ ⊂ cog(P)
Proof. Take v ∈ C∗, for each direction λ, there exists a pair (p,f) δ-balanced
and λ-directed, s.t. λ · v ≤ λ · vδ(p,f) ≤ λ · g(p). Obviously, p ∈ P. Thus ∀λ,
λ · v ≤ supx∈g(P)λ · x and therefore C∗ ⊂ cog(P). 14 TRISTAN TOMALA
We examine now a stronger notion of enforceability which will be useful for the
Folk Theorem.
Deﬁnition 6.7. (1) Given a direction λ, the distribution p is enforceable with
respect to λ-hyperplanes if there exists a mapping f and a discount factor δ
such that (p,f) is δ-balanced and there exists a real number k s.t. ∀(a,y),
λ · f(a,y) = k.
(2) A vector λ = (λ1,...,λn) is singular if there is a unique i s.t. λi 6= 0.
Otherwise, λ is called regular. Given a pair of players i 6= j, a ij-vector is
a regular λ s.t. λk = 0 for k 6= i, k 6= j.
(3) Given a pair of players i 6= j, p is enforceable with respect to ij-hyperplanes
if p is enforceable with respect to λ-hyperplanes for each ij-vector λ.
These deﬁnitions bear the following properties.
Lemma 6.8. (1) The distribution p is enforceable with respect to λ-
hyperplanes if and only if there exists a mapping f and a discount factor δ
such that (p,f) is δ-balanced and ∀(a,y), λ · f(a,y) = 0.
(2) If p is enforceable with respect to λ-hyperplanes, then λ · g(p) ≤ k(λ).
(3) If for all pair of players i 6= j, p is enforceable with respect to ij-hyperplanes,
then p is enforceable with respect to λ-hyperplanes for all regular λ.
Proof. (1). If (p,f) is δ-balanced, so is (p,f + β) for each β ∈ Rn. Thus if ∀(a,y),
λ·f(a,y) = k, for each real k0 one can choose β such that ∀(a,y), λ·(f(a,y)+β) = k0.
(2). In the above proof, choose β s.t. k0 = λ·g(p) and set f0(a,y) = f(a,y)+β.
Then λ · ((1 − δ)g(p) + δQ(p) · f0)) = λ · g(p). Thus, (p,f) is λ-directed and
λ · g(p) ≤ k(λ).
(3). Fix the discount factor. Assume that for each ij-vector λ, p is enforce-
able with respect to λ-hyperplanes. Let λ be a regular vector. Assume ﬁrst that
the number of players s.t. λi 6= 0 is even, i.e. up to a relabelling of players,
λ = (λ1,λ2,...,λK,λK+1,0,...,0). For the 2K ﬁrst players, for each pair (k,k+1)




(Q(p) − Q(p,dk)) · fk ≥ 1−δ
δ (gk(p,dk) − gk(p)) (∀dk)
(Q(p) − Q(p,dk+1)) · fk+1 ≥ 1−δ
δ (gk+1(p,dk+1) − gk+1(p)) (∀dk+1)
λkfk(a,y) + λk+1fk+1(a,y) = 0 (∀(a,y))
This exists from point (1). For other players i, choose fi that solves:
(3)

(Q(p) − Q(p,di)) · fi ≥
1 − δ
δ
(gi(p,di) − gi(p)) (∀di)
This exists since p is enforceable. This deﬁnes a mapping f which has all the
required properties by construction.
Assume now that the number of players s.t. λi 6= 0 is odd, i.e. λ =
(λ1,λ2,...,λK,λK+1,λK+2,0,...,0). For players i s.t. λi = 0, solve the system
(3). For players k s.t. λk 6= 0 and k > 3, solve the system (2) for the pair (k,k+1).






(Q(p) − Q(p,d1)) · f1 ≥ 1−δ
δ (g1(p,d1) − g1(p)) (∀d1)
(Q(p) − Q(p,d2)) · f2 ≥ 1−δ
δ (g2(p,d2) − g2(p)) (∀d2)
λ1f1(a,y) + λ
2
2 f2(a,y) = 0 (∀(a,y))






(Q(p) − Q(p,d2)) · f2 ≥ 1−δ
δ (g2(p,d1) − g2(p)) (∀d2)
(Q(p) − Q(p,d3)) · f3 ≥ 1−δ
δ (g3(p,d3) − g3(p)) (∀d3)
λ
2
2 f2(a,y) + λ3f3(a,y) = 0 (∀(a,y))PERFECT COMMUNICATION 15
Finally set f1 = f1




∗∗ and f3 = f3
∗. As before, the so-deﬁned
mapping f has all required properties: recall that if f2
∗ and f2
∗∗ satisfy the incentive
constraints for player 2, then so does their average f2. 
7. The Folk Theorem
We give here suﬃcient conditions to obtain a Folk Theorem: C∗ = V ∗. We
indeed give conditions under which for each v ∈ V ∗ and direction λ, there exists p
enforceable with respect to λ-hyperplanes such that λ · v ≤ λ · g(p).
We say that a mixed decision rule µi for player i is an undetectable deviation if
∀a, Q(a,µi) = Q(a), that is for every proﬁle of recommended actions, the mediator
cannot tell from the reported signals whether player i is playing faithfully or devi-
ating to µi. If some player has an undetectable deviation, he might gain from it by
increasing his stage payoﬀ without aﬀcting future payoﬀs. We thus give a condition
that copes with undetectable deviations.
Fix a pair of players (i,j) and assume that an agent (call him deviator, to diﬀer-
entiate him from the mediator) takes control of player i or of player j and makes
one of them deviate but not both. That is, the deviator can choose any decision
rule in Di ∪ Dj. A mixed strategy for the deviator is a probability distribution
on Di ∪ Dj and can be represented by a tuple (t,µi,µj) where: t ∈ [0,1] is the
probability that the deviator takes control of player i, µi is the distribution induced
on Di given that the deviator takes control of player i and µj is the distribution
induced on Dj given that the deviator takes control of player j. We say that the
deviator is faithful if, whichever player he takes control of, he makes this player
play his faithful strategy, i.e. tµi(ϕi) + (1 − t)µj(ϕj) = 1. A tuple (t,µi,µj) which
is not faithful is called a deviation. A deviation is detectable by the mediator if
there exists an action proﬁle a, such that the distribution of reported signals under
the deviation is diﬀerent from the distribution induced by the faithful strategies,
i.e. there exists a s.t. Q(a) 6= tQ(a,µi) + (1 − t)Q(a,µj). Otherwise, the deviation
in undetectable. The ﬁrst condition says that the deviator has no undetectable
deviations.
Condition C1. For each pair of players i,j, for each mixed decision rules
µi ∈ ∆(Di), µj ∈ ∆(Dj) and t ∈ [0,1],





∃a ∈ A,Q(a) 6= tQ(a,µi) + (1 − t)Q(a,µj)

.
Since for each p ∈ ∆(A), Q(p,µi))(a,y) = p(a)Q(a,µi)(y), Q(a) = tQ(a,µi) +
(1 − t)Q(a,µj), (∀a) holds if and only if there exists p ∈ int∆(A) such that
Q(p) = tQ(p,µi) + (1 − t)Q(p,µj) and in turn, this holds for all p ∈ int∆(A).
That is:
Claim 7.1. Condition (C1) holds if and only if for each pair of players (i,j), there
exists p ∈ int∆(A) such that:







where co is the convex hull operator. In such case, (C1(i,j,p)) holds for all
p ∈ int∆(A).
Condition (C1) implies clearly that no single player has an undetectable devia-
tion:16 TRISTAN TOMALA






∃a ∈ A,Q(a) 6= Q(a,µi)

.
Therefore, under (C1) for each p ∈ int∆(A) no player i has a proﬁtable unde-
tectable deviation from p. From 6.5, p is enforceable.
Suppose now that a deviation has been detected by the mediator. If he can not
ascribe it to a particular player, he has to punish several players simultaneously,
which may cause a loss of eﬃciency. We will then ask the mediator to be able to
diﬀerentiate between player i and player j’s deviations.
Condition C2. For each pair of players i,j, for each mixed decision rules
µi ∈ ∆(Di), µj ∈ ∆(Dj),





∀a ∈ A,Q(a,µi) = Q(a,µj) = Q(a)

.
This says that if two mixed decision rules induce the same distribution of reported
signals, then this distribution is the one induced by the faithful strategy. Or, if one
player deviates in a detectable way (∃a, s.t. Q(a,µi) 6= Q(a)), then he creates a
distribution which diﬀer from one created by another player (∃a, s.t. Q(a,µi) 6=
Q(a,µj)). Again, since for each p ∈ ∆(A), Q(p,µi)(a,y) = p(a)Q(a,µi)(y), condi-






Q(p,µi) = Q(p,µj) = Q(p)

and in such case, this holds for every p ∈ int∆(A). Thus,
Claim 7.3. Condition (C2) holds if and only if for each pair of players (i,j), there








and in such case, (C2(i,j,p)) holds for all p ∈ int∆(A).
To get the Folk Theorem, we need two additional conditions.
Condition C3. For each player i, there exists p enforceable that maximises i’s
payoﬀ, i.e. p ∈ P and gi(p) = maxa∈Agi(a).
Condition C4. For each player i, there exists p enforceable that is a minmax
distribution for player i, i.e. P ∩ Mi 6= ∅.
Conditions (C1) and (C2) are generalizations of conditons (A2) and (A3) respec-
tively of Kandori and Matsushima [KM98]. Our conditions are weaker: Kandori and
Matsushima assume that (the analog of) conditions (C1(i,j,a)) and (C2(i,j,a))1
hold for every pure action proﬁle a whose payoﬀ vector is extremal in V and for ev-
ery pair of players. That is, at every pure (extremal) action proﬁle, one can detect
all deviations and ascribe it to a single player. Conditions (C1) and (C2) ask that
for every pair of players (i,j) and pair of decision rules (µi,µj), there exists a proﬁle
a, depending on (i,j,µi,µj), such that at a, the mediator can detect the deviation
and diﬀerentiate µi from µj. Note that under (C1) (resp. (C2)), (C1(i,j,p)) (resp.
(C2(i,j,p)) hold for every pair (i,j) and completely mixed p. The conditions (A2)
and (A3) of Kandori and Matsushima clearly imply (C1) and (C2). Intuitively, we
need weaker conditions since the mediator, knowing the proﬁle of recommended
actions and of reported signals has a better information on the deviation than any
player has. Condition (C3) is implied by (A2) of Kandori and Matsushima and
1we indentify a and the Dirac measure on aPERFECT COMMUNICATION 17
(C4) is the essentially the same as (A1) of [KM98]. We give in the next section
examples of signals that verify our conditions but not those of [KM98].
On another hand, [KM98] conditions are formulated on the signaling technology
q of the stage game whereas our conditions are formulated on distributions of re-
ported signals which are more diﬃcult to handle. However, since each player has
ﬁnitely many decision rules, our conditions are reasonably tractable.
Let relV be the relative interior of V , since g is linear on ∆(A), relV =
g(int∆(A)).
Theorem 7.4. Under conditions (C1), (C2), (C3) and (C4), if relV ∩ IR 6= ∅,
C∗ = V ∗.
Proof. Since C∗ ⊂ V ∗, we prove that for each v ∈ relV ∩ IR and each direction
λ there exists p ∈ ∆(A) which is enforceable with respect to λ-hyperplanes such
that λ · v ≤ λg(p). From lemma 6.8, this implies λ · v ≤ k(λ) and thus v ∈ C∗.
Since C∗ is closed and the closure of relV ∩IR is V ∗, this gives the result. Fix thus
v ∈ relV ∩ IR. We treat ﬁrst singular vectors λ then regular vectors.
Singular vectors.
Case 1. λ = ei, the unit vector whose i-component is 1 and other components are
zero. Let p be an enforceable distribution that maximizes i’s payoﬀ, this exists from
(C3). Then vi ≤ gi(p). Since p is enforceable, for each player j 6= i, there exists fj
that solves the system:

(Q(p) − Q(p,dj)) · fj ≥
1 − δ
δ
(gj(p,dj) − gj(p)) (∀dj)
Under p, each ai s.t. p(ai) > 0 is a best response to p(·|ai), thus one can choose
fi to be constant, so let fi(a,y) = gi(p) for each (a,y) and (p,f) is δ-balanced.
Clearly λ · fi(a,y) is constant, thus p is enforceable with respect to λ-hyperplanes.
Case 2. λ = −ei. Let p be an enforceable distribution that is also a minmax distri-
bution for player i, this exists from (C4). Then vi ≥ gi(p) = mi. Again, since p is
enforceable, for each player j 6= i, there exists fj that solves the system:

(Q(p) − Q(p,dj)) · fj ≥
1 − δ
δ
(gj(p,dj) − gj(p)) (∀dj)
Since p is in Mi, each ai s.t. p(ai) > 0 is a best response to p(·|ai), thus one can
choose fi to be constant, so let fi(a,y) = mi for each (a,y) and (p,f) is δ-balanced.
As in the previous case λ·fi(a,y) is constant, thus p is enforceable with respect to
λ-hyperplanes.
Regular vectors.
Let λ be a regular vector. Since v belongs to the relative interior of V , there
exists p ∈ int∆(A) such that v = g(p). We prove that (A1) and (A2) imply that
p is enforceable with respect to ij-hyperplanes for all pair (i,j). Fix thus a pair of
players (i,j) and a vector λ s.t. λiλj 6= 0 and λk = 0, for each k 6= i, k 6= j. Since
p is enforceable, for each such players k, there exists fk that solves the system:

(Q(p) − Q(p,dk)) · fk ≥
1 − δ
δ
(gk(p,dk) − gk(p)) (∀dk)
Case 1. λiλj > 0. From condition (C2), (C2(i,j,p)) holds and by the separation
theorem, there exists a mapping ` : A × Y → Rn s.t.
Q(p,dj) · ` < Q(p) · ` < Q(p,di) · `18 TRISTAN TOMALA
for all decision rules di 6= ϕi ,dj 6= ϕj. For t > 0, set fi = t` and fj = − λ
i
λjfi.
Obviously, λifi + λjfj = 0. The system of incentive constraints for player i now
writes:

t(Q(p) − Q(p,di)) · ` ≥
1 − δ
δ
(gi(p,di) − gi(p)) (∀di)
which is veriﬁed for large enough t since the left-hand side is positive for di 6= ϕi.




λj(Q(p) − Q(p,dj)) · ` ≥
1 − δ
δ
(gj(p,dj) − gj(p)) (∀dj)
which is also veriﬁed for large enough t since (Q(p) − Q(p,dj)) · ` is negative for
dj 6= ϕj.
Case 2. λiλj < 0. From condition (C1), (C1(i,j,p)) holds and by the separation
theorem, there exists a mapping ` : A × Y → Rn s.t.
Q(p,dh) · ` < Q(p) · `
for h = i,j and all decision rules dh 6= ϕh. As before, for t > 0, set fi = t` and
fj = − λ
i
λjfi. Again, λifi + λjfj = 0 and the system of incentive constraints for
player i writes:

t(Q(p) − Q(p,di)) · ` ≥
1 − δ
δ
(gi(p,di) − gi(p)) (∀di)




λj(Q(p) − Q(p,dj)) · ` ≥
1 − δ
δ
(gj(p,dj) − gj(p)) (∀dj)
which is also veriﬁed for large enough t. The proof of the theorem is thus complete.

8. Example: a partnership game
Consider a ﬁrm employing 4 workers. Each worker has two actions: work or
shirk. The output of the ﬁrm depends on the action proﬁle and the associated
proﬁt increases with the number of agents who work. The manager oﬀers a day-to-
day salary to each worker, which might depend on the output. The wage contract
thus deﬁnes a (one-shot) game between the workers. This game is played each
day and the players discount payoﬀs at a common rate. We assume here that the
manager is a non-strategic agent, that is, the wage contract is known by all agents
and is ﬁxed once and for all throughout the game. For example, the workers are
the owners/shareholders of the ﬁrm and the manager is paid a ﬁxed amount inde-
pendent of outcomes. This assumption can also be the result of legal dispositions
regarding wages. We may thus regard the manager as a trustworthy mediator for
this game.
The goal of the manager is to get the employees to work each day. The problem
he faces is how to verify this? A simple way to do it is to crowd all employees in
the same oﬃce, so that each worker’s action is monitored by all his peers, and to
ask each person to report his observation at the end of the day. Under unilateral
deviations, i.e. assuming that at most one player shirks and produces false reports,
a strict majority of players will report to the manager the action proﬁle actually
played. A punishing strategy can thus be triggered in case of deviation.PERFECT COMMUNICATION 19
Suppose now that the ﬁrm’s building has two oﬃces, each containing at most
two persons. Say, players 1 and 2 are oﬃce-mates and so are players 3 and 4. If
the manager/mediator still asks each player to report his observations at the end
of the day, he might not be able to tell which player is deviating. Suppose player 2
claims that player 1 has deviated. Either this statement is true or it is a deviation
of player 2 to induce a punishment against player 1.
The manager thus hires an inspector who chooses each day which oﬃce to in-
spect or may shirk. The manager then has to handle a ﬁve player game where: each
worker has two actions, work, shirk, and the inspector has three actions: inspect
room A, inspect room B or shirk. The signaling structure is as follows: each worker
monitors the action of his oﬃce-mate and knows whether the inspector is in the
oﬃce or not. The inspector monitors the actions of the players in the oﬃce he is
inspecting, if he inspects, and observes nothing if he shirks.
This signaling structure does not verify the conditions of [KM98]. Given any
pure action proﬁle, there is an oﬃce which is not inspected and thus deviations by
players in this oﬃce cannot be diﬀerentiated. On the other hand our conditions are
fulﬁlled. Take a pair of workers and a deviation for each. If they are in diﬀerent
oﬃces, say player 1 or player 3 deviates, then their deviations created diﬀerent re-
ported signals: a deviation of player 1 wil be reported by player 2 while a deviation
of player 3 will be reported by player 4. If the two players are in the same oﬃce,
say player 1 or 2 deviates, then their deviations are detected and diﬀerentiated at
an action proﬁle where the inspector inspects their oﬃce. Last case, assume that
the pair of players under consideration contains the inspector. Deviations by the
inspector can be detected and indentifed: if the inspector shirks all players will
report not having seen him, if the inspector inspects the wrong oﬃce, the mediator
will know it from the worker’s reports. Therefore conditions C1 and C2 hold. Since
every unilateral deviation can be detected at every action proﬁle, every correlated
distribution on actions is enforcable and therefore C4 and C5 also hold.
9. Appendix
We give now a proof of theorem 5.5 along the lines of [FLM94] and [FL94].
Proof of theorem 5.5, point (1). We need to prove that C(δ) ⊂
T
λHλ. By contra-
diction, assume that for some λ there exists v ∈ C(δ) such that v · λ > k(λ). Let
then v∗ ∈ C(δ) that maximizes v·λ on C(δ), one has v∗·λ > k(λ) and v∗·λ ≥ v·λ
for each v ∈ C(δ). Since C(δ) ⊂ Fδ(C(δ)), there exists (p,f) δ-balanced, λ-directed
such that f ∈ C(δ), v∗ = vδ(p,f) which contradicts the deﬁnition of k(λ). 
Proof of point (2). Let E be the aﬃne subspace of Rn spanned by the convex C∗.
In the proof that follows, E is endowed with the norm induced by the euclidean
norm on Rn and all topological notions such as neighborhood, interior, boundary
are taken with respect to the topology of E. For example, the interior of C∗ with
respect to this topology (the relative interior of C∗) is non-empty.
Deﬁnition 9.1. A set W ⊂ E is locally self-decomposable if for each v ∈ W, there
exists an open neighborhood U of v and a discount factor δU such that U ⊂ FδU(W).
Proposition 9.2. If a convex and compact set W ⊂ E is locally self-decomposable
then there exists δ0 such that for each δ ≥ δ0, W ⊂ C(δ).
Proof. Take a locally self-decomposable convex compact set W, for each for each
v ∈ W, there exists an open neighborhood U of v and a discount factor δU such
that U ⊂ FδU(W). The U’s form an open cover of W. Take a ﬁnite subcover and
let δ0 be the maximum of δU over this subcover. For each δ ≥ δ0 and v ∈ W there20 TRISTAN TOMALA
is U in the subcover such that v ∈ U and thus v ∈ FδU(W), i.e. there exists (p,fU)









the pair (p,f) is δ-balanced, v = vδ(p,f) and since v ∈ W, fU ∈ W and W convex,
f ∈ W. Thus, v ∈ Fδ(W) i.e. W ⊂ Fδ(W) and from theorem 4.5, W ⊂ C(δ).

To complete the proof of theorem 5.5, we approximate the convex C∗ by smooth
sets. A subset W ⊂ E is smooth if it is convex compact, has non-empty interior and
its boundary is a C2 submanifold of E. The last step of the proof is to show that
for each smooth W ⊂ int C∗, there exists δ0 such that for each δ ≥ δ0, W ⊂ C(δ).
This follows directly from the next proposition.
Proposition 9.3. Let W be a smooth set W ⊂ int C∗, then W is locally self-
decomposable.
Proof. We need to prove that for each for each v ∈ W, there exists an open neigh-
borhood U of v and a discount factor δU such that U ⊂ FδU(W).
Case 1. Take v in the interior of W. Let ε > 0 such that U = B(v,3ε), the ball
centered at v with radius 3ε is a subset of W and ﬁx p a correlated equilibrium of
the stage game.
Claim. ∃δ < 1, ∀u ∈ B(v,), ∃w ∈ W such that u = (1 − δ)g(p) + δw.
Proof of the claim. Given u ∈ B(v,) and δ < 1, set w = 1
δu − 1−δ
δ g(p).
Then, kw − uk ≤ 1−δ
δ ku − g(p)k and kw − vk ≤ ku − vk + 1−δ
δ ku − g(p)k. Now,
ku − g(p)k is bounded by some M > 0 as u varies in W, thus kw − vk ≤ ε+ 1−δ
δ M
which is less than 2ε for δ close enough to one. 
Deﬁne now the mapping f(a,y) = w for each (a,y). Since p is a correlated equi-
librium, the pair (p,f) is δ-balanced from proposition 5.2 and u = vδ(p,f). Thus
U ⊂ Fδ(W). This ends the ﬁrst case.
Case 2. Consider now v on the boundary of W. Since W is smooth, there is a
unique hyperplane tangent on W at v and let λ be normal to W at v. Let (p,f) be a
pair that achieves the maximum in the deﬁnition of k(λ). Then (p,f) is δ0-balanced
for some δ0 and the tangent hyperplane to W at v strictly separates g(p) from W.
The line connecting g(p) and v thus crosses the boundary of W and therefore there
exists δ0 < 1 such that for each δ > δ0, the point wδ deﬁned by v = (1−δ)g(p)+δwδ
is in the interior of W. Let us now deﬁne the mapping fδ for each (a,y) by:
fδ(a,y) = wδ +
(1 − δ)δ0
δ(1 − δ0)
(f(a,y) − ¯ f)
From proposition 5.2, (p,fδ) is δ-balanced, v = vδ(p,fδ) and for each (a,y),
kfδ(a,y) − wδk ≤ M 1−δ
δ with M = M(p,f,δ0). We have then the following geo-
metric result.
Lemma 9.4. ∃δ00, s.t. ∀δ > δ00, the ball centered at wδ with radius M 1−δ
δ is in the
interior of W.
Proof. Choose a new coordinates system. Assume v = 0, let H be the hyperplane
{x | λ · x = λ · v} and L be the line connecting g(p) and v. Write each x ∈ Rn as
x = (xH,xL) with xH ∈ H and xL ∈ L. There is X a neighborhood of the origin
such that X ∩ W is the hypograph of a concave C2 function ϕ : X ∩ H → R s.t.PERFECT COMMUNICATION 21
ϕ(0) = 0 and the gradient of ϕ at zero is zero. By Taylor’s theorem, there is a






implies x ∈ int W. There exist two positive constants α,β s.t. for


















δ )2, which is true for δ close enough to one. 
We have proved so far that for the payoﬀ vector v, there exists a discount factor δ
and a δ-balanced pair (p,f) s.t. v = vδ(p,fδ) and f ∈ B(wδ,M 1−δ
δ ) ⊂ intW. Then
for v0 in a neighborhood of v, deﬁne for each (a,y), f0(a,y) = fδ(a,y) + 1
δ(v0 − v).
Clearly, (p,f0) is δ-balanced, vδ(p,f0) = v0 and f0(a,y) lies in the interior of W for
kv0 − vk is small enough. The proof is thus complete. 
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